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LAWYERS, SCHOLARS, AND THE
"MIDDLE GROUND"
Robert W. Gordon*

One of the many virtues of Judge Harry Edwards' very interesting
polemic1 is that it issues an open invitation to say what one likes about
present legal scholarship, without having to document it too carefully;
and it provokes one to more than perfunctory reflection about what to
say.
Judge Edwards has three complaints. (1) He and his clerks have
had trouble lately finding law review articles that bear directly on the
legal questions he needs to answer. (2) Instead, he finds far too much
"impractical" scholarship2 - usually theoretical, interdisciplinary
("law and"), or critical work - which is of little or no help to practitioners. Either it does not address any legal "problem" they "must
resolve," 3 or it does address legal problems but uses resources other
than "authoritative legal materials" to resolve them. 4 (3) Judge Edwards' third complaint is about legal practice, especially as carried on
in law firms. In recent years, firm lawyers have been driven to pursue
profits to the point of neglecting other values, especially those of ethical and public-spirited practice.
Not satisfied to rely entirely on his own impressions, Judge Edwards has done an informal survey of thirty of his former law clerks,
who mostly confirm his findings. Then the judge ingeniously rolls his
three complaints into one: a general thesis of declension. Both law
schools and law firms, he says, have fallen away from their "proper
place": the schools by "emphasizing abstract theory at the expense of
practical scholarship and pedagogy," the firms by "pursuing profit
above all else." 5 While the schools, filled with scholars increasingly
* Professor of Law, Stanford University. - Ed. I would like to thank Ariela Gross for
research into the contents of law reviews and for many discussions that clarified my thinking
about this subject; and Bob Weisberg and Tom Grey for useful comments on an earlier draft.
This work was supported by a bequest from the Claire and Michael Brown Estate.
1. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992).
2. Id. at 46.
3. Id.

4. Id. at 47. Articles written from the perspective of critical legal studies exemplify the first
vice, law and economics, the second.
5. Id. at 34.
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"disdainful of the practice of law" 6 are "moving toward pure theory,
the firms are moving toward pure commerce, and the middle ground
- ethical practice - has been deserted by both. This disjunction calls
into question our status as an honorable profession. " 7
A suggestive parallel, is it not? The Judge seems to be arguing that
both teachers and firm lawyers have been seduced from their real vocation by the fatal attraction of neighboring cultures: the practitioners
by the commercial culture of their business clients, the academics by
the disciplinary paradigms and prestige of theory in the rest of the
university. The "deserted middle ground" is the ground of professional practice - practical, yet also public-minded. Perhaps without
straining his thesis too far we could ascribe to Judge Edwards a "republican" view of the legal profession, in which legal scholars, practitioners, judges, legislators, and administrators - despite their separate
interests and distinct roles in a division of labor - are all participants
in a common enterprise. They are, or at any rate ought to be, engaged
in trying to construct the legal system as a medium in which the pursuit of private advantage - their own and that of their clients and
constituencies - can be aligned with some plausible conception of the
public interest.
If Judge Edwards has something like this in mind, I have a lot of
sympathy with it. 8 And I have to admit right away that his critique of
current legal scholarship, though I will be arguing shortly that it is an
indiscriminate and overgeneralized critique, has a gritty core of unpleasant truth. The legal-academic machine is undoubtedly cranking
out a good deal of useless blather: articles that seem to have hardly
anything to do with addressing or understanding any legal problem,
articles clotted with hermetic jargon or puffed up with self-indulgent
6. Id. at 35.
7. Id. at 34.
8. I am one of a group of scholars who have been pushing for a revival of the view that even
private lawyers working for private clients ought to behave as members of a public profession
pursuing public values and purposes. We have defended that view against the powerful rival
position that the only proper public concern of lawyers is to avoid flat disobedience of clear
positive legal and ethical rules while zealously pursuing the self-interest of their clients as those
clients perceive it. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE (1988); Richard L. Abel, Taking
Professionalism Seriously. 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 41; Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as a Public Calling, 49 Mo. L. REv. 255 (1990) [hereinafter Gordon, Corporate Law Practice]; Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1983); Deborah L.
Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589 (1985); William H. Simon,
Babbitt v. Brandeis: The Decline ofthe Professional Ideal 37 STAN. L. REV. 565 (1985); William
H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988); William H. Simon,
Visions of Practice in Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 469 (1984) [hereinafter Simon, Visions];
David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468 (1990) [hereinafter Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers]; David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?. 105 HARV.
L. REV. 799 (1992).
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posturing, articles clumsily practicing intellectual modes that people
in other fields execute with much more grace and precision, articles
borrowing intellectual fashions that would be better off never having
been invented. But Judge Edwards' vision of what we should be doing,
of what the "middle ground" of practical-yet-public-minded professionalism ought to look like, is incredibly, even distressingly, narrow
- indeed very much narrower than any of the major views of professionalism and the proper functions of legal scholarship that commentators have entertained since the creation of the modem bar and
modem law school in the late nineteenth century. 9 In what follows I
would like to explain what I think Judge Edwards' vision of the professional enterprise is, and why I think it is unacceptably limited.
Moreover, I want to specify how a broader vision would reveal that a
good deal of the scholarship that Judge Edwards believes is irrelevant
to the professional enterprise is practically useful, or would be if anyone wanted to use it. I will finish by offering my own speculations on
the reasons scholars and practitioners are discontented with one another and by gesturing vaguely in the direction of possible remedies.

I.

EDWARDS' MODAL LEGAL ACTIVITY:
JUDICIAL-DOCTRINAL DISCOURSE

Judge Edwards thinks that what lawyers do, what they should be
taught how to do, and what most legal scholarship should address is
law. Further, his idea of the core legal activity is his own principal
activity, the production of judicial doctrine, that is, case law. The
most important equipment one needs to perform this activity is knowledge of existing conventional rules and craft skill in operating the conventional method of their application - for example, arguing from
precedent and reading statutes. 10 This set of skills is not only necessary, but also sufficient, for handling ninety percent of cases, the
"easy" cases that one can readily resolve by finding, and then applying, the settled authoritative law.
Evidently, Judge Edwards is taking up a strong position on greatly
disputed issues of jurisprudence. His jurisprudence is central to his
thesis because it defines the scope of what he considers "relevant" and
9. To be fair I must mention that Judge Edwards repeatedly disclaims any desire to exclude
any kind of scholarship, however impractical, from the legal academy. He says often that there
is a "place" for theoretical, interdisciplinary, and critical scholarship, though he wishes it were
smaller. In making these concessions he proves himself more generous and cosmopolitan than
many inhabitants of the legal academy.
10. Later in his article, Judge Edwards significantly adds another skill - that of "ethical" or
public-minded interpretation oflegal materials. Edwards, supra note 1, at 59. I will come back
to this point. See infra text accompanying note 50.
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"practical" contributions from scholars. His position depends on a
conception of the judge as primarily a law-declarer and only marginally and incrementally a policymaker. The great mass of the law at
any time is already settled. There is a fringe of "hard cases" - perhaps, though he is not clear about this, a receding fringe of historical
anachronisms ripe for judicial repeal, an advancing fringe of modern
tendencies ripe for judicial innovation, and some other fringe areas
where current law is conflicting or confused. To work in the fringe
areas, it is useful for lawyers to have some familiarity with "theory"
and "policy" and the ability to argue from them. But this set of skills
is distinctly secondary because it is "practical" only in a very limited
set of contexts, the ten percent involving argument over "hard cases."
For Judge Edwards, it follows from this account of the core legal activity that the main business of scholars should be to help judges, and
lawyers arguing before them, to "find" the existing law - all
presented in the conventional form of judicial-doctrinal discourse.
"Practical" scholarship thus ideally takes the form of the article addressed to some specific knotty doctrinal problem that is already, or
soon likely to be, before the courts; or, even better, of the treatise devoted to encyclopedic exposition of all the doctrine in some legal field.
Judge Edwards' view of legal reasoning is undoubtedly widespread
in our legal culture. It still seems to be the official view, in the sense
that judges and lawyers arguing before judges feel constrained to talk
as if it were true. It is reflected in the distinction one often hears made
between "legal" and "policy" arguments. But it is hardly the only
view around. Most modern lawyers even faintly influenced by legal
realism - which category probably would include most law teachers
nowadays and not a few judges 11 - would call this a "prerealist" or
"formalist" position and reject it. They would argue that, although
doctrine supplies the language of legal - or rather, judicial - decisionmaking, it is not the major factor in deciding cases and that purely
doctrinal scholarship is therefore of quite limited utility. Outside the
restricted area of practice before the courts, which is only a small part
of what actors in our legal system do, doctrine is even less useful.

II.

SOME MODAL TYPES OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, ALONG WITH
ARGUMENTS FOR THEIR PRACTICAL UTILITY

I will return in a moment to what might be meant by "postrealist"
law practice and the sorts of scholarship designed to support it. For
11. For an example of a judge thoroughly drenched in realism, save for an Achilles' heel of
residual formalist faith in microeconomics and sociobiology, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990).
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now I would like to point out that even if one were to accept Judge
Edwards' apparently prerealist view of judging, one might still think
his notions of "practical" scholarship are unduly restrictive. He
would like us to spend most of our time on doctrinal exposition for
judges.
Type # 1: Traditional Legal Science, or, Retheorizing the Case Law

Even the heroic treatise writers of the classical age of formalism
(1880-1920) that Judge Edwards apparently wants to restore had a
more ambitious view of their function than to present the existing doctrines. True, they did try to collect and keep up with all the case law
in their fields. But their real aspiration was to do "legal science" not just to collect and arrange the cases, but to show how they might
be rationalized in terms of general concepts or principles. The early
writers on contracts and torts, for example, were not content just to
lay out the common law as they found it, which was a motley assortment of miscellaneous "actions on the case" - "a chaos with a full
index," as Holmes called it. 12 Instead they stretched and pounded the
doctrine into a greatly simplified - and hence ultimately much more
useful - order, creating in the process many of our modem categories
such as the distinctions among contract, quasi- contract and tort, and
among intentional, negligent, and strict bases of tort liability.
This enterprise of reconceptualizing the principled bases of doctrine was surely highly theoretical, in Judge Edwards' terms. Indeed
its motto, to quote Holmes again, was that "[w]e have too little theory
in the law rather than too much." 13 It relied heavily on historical
research too, not for reasons of antiquarian curiosity, but because the
scholars believed that only the study of the development of legal doctrines could reveal their organizing conceptions. It was also critical
and reformist in spirit. The everyday official doctrine as expounded in
the courts, said the scholars, was often useless for sorting out the cases
and understanding their "true basis" in principle. Critical retheorizing in the articles and treatises was hardly limited to the "hard cases"
in the fringe areas. Its subject was the mass of routine cases: the aim
12. Holmes actually borrowed this phrase from the English jurisprude T.E. Holland. See
Book Notice, s AM. L. REV. 114, 114 (1870) (reviewing THOMAS E. HOLLAND, EssAYS UPON
THE FORM OF LAW (London, Butterworths 1870)) (quoting THOMAS F. HOLLAND, The Classification of Statutes, in EssAYS, supra, at 171). For Holmes' authorship of this review, see SHELDON M. NOVICK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 402 (1989)
(listing Holmes' publications in the American Law Review).
13. OLIVER W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 198
(1920).
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was to rethink entire areas of doctrine. 14 The scholars' articles and
treatises were designed to reshape the minds and reform the practices
of practitioners and judges, not just to supply handy research aids. In
short, the bargain that the early academics aimed to strike with the
bar was basically this: "We'll collect and give you cites to all the
cases, if you'll adopt our theoretical schemes and reform proposals."
If the scholars were lucky, as they frequently were, the bench and bar
would pick up on the new formulations, which would find their way
into restatements and the opinions of distinguished judges, and eventually become the common sense of the field.
The failure of judges and practitioners to pick up their reform
ideas did not discourage the scholars of the classical age, who
promptly turned to legislation. An important aspect of the "Vocation
of the Law Professor," as Dean James Barr Ames put it, was to master
the "science" of law in order to become an "expert counselor in legislation"; 15 many scholars were active in the drafting of uniform state
laws and other reform statutes, as of course academics still are today.
Currently a good deal oflegal scholarship and teaching simply carries on this "classical" project of trying to find a theory that will effectively organize and rationalize the cases better than the official
doctrine does. Those of us who teach contracts, for instance, know
that the standard doctrinal test for "duress" - whether consent was
induced by a threat that overcame the party's "free will" - is totally
unworkable. It cannot be operationally applied and does not tell you
anything at all about which kinds of pressure will make the deal voidable and which will not. Of course we still teach the doctrinalformula,
the "free will" test, because that is the language many courts - despite the efforts of generations of law reformers - expect to hear. But
we would be complete derelicts as trainers of future lawyers if we allowed our students to think the "free will" test made sense and if we
did not help them to find a formulation outside the recognized doctrine that would serve them better. A lot of theory is needed to work
effectively with the easy cases of the system, never mind the hard ones.

14. One of the first treatises of the classical age, for example, JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMI·
NARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE CoMMON LAW (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1898),
undertook what was for the time a radical reordering of the field. Thayer's work was built
around a powerful organizing theory: that most standard "evidence" rules were not about evi·
dence at all, but rules of substantive law, which scholars should precipitate out of the field en·
tirely and reassign to their proper substantive law categories. Once that was done, the remaining
rules could be more easily regrouped and retheorized.
15. See JAMES B. AMES, The Vocation of the Law Professor, in LECTURES ON LEGAL HIS·
TORY AND MISCELLANEOUS LEGAL EssAYS 354, 354, 367-68 (1913).
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Type # 2: Realist Legal Science, or Finding the Policy or
Value Subtext
Judge Edwards thinks scholars should write about doctrine because that is what decides the easy cases. The position of lawyers influenced by realism is, of course, that the "real" factors on which
courts rely when they frame rules and principles, or choose among
broad or narrow readings of precedents or statutes, are likely to lie
outside the doctrine - in more or less "[in]articulate major premise[s]"16 of ethics, economics, or politics, or else in situation-specific
responses to peculiarities of factual context. Such lawyers, obviously,
will continue to prize the ability to argue and rationalize results in the
official doctrinal discourse. But they will prize even more the ability
to dig beneath the surface of doctrinal rationales to the substratum of
"real" decisional factors.
The postrealist scholar, like the classical one, may well start by
surveying an area of doctrine, such as the cases on whether modifications in midcontract are enforceable. She finds that conventional doctrine asks whether both parties have supplied a fresh "consideration"
for the modification, because if one or the other has promised only to
perform a preexisting duty there is no consideration and the modification is unenforceable. She also finds that courts can and often do easily avoid the preexisting duty rule by slipping through any one of a
number of doctrinal escape hatches.17 She concludes that some policy
or value other than the nominal (consideration) doctrine must "really"
lie behind the decisions: perhaps the courts want to enforce contract
adjustments agreed to in good faith but to police against extortionate
hold-up games by parties who have locked contract partners into reliance by part performance. She is likely then to search the case law and, if she is enterprising enough, even look outside the case law to
typical commercial situations - for clues about what is conventionally thought to be good or bad faith in various contexts. She may well
finish up by recommending that the modification doctrine be altered so
that the covert "real" basis of decision becomes the overt one. If
judges want to take up her invitation, fine; if they do not, because they
16. The reference is of course to Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) ("General propositions do not decide concrete cases. The decision will depend on a
judgment or intuition more subtle than any articulate major premise."), overruled by Dag-Brite
Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952), and overruled by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S.
726 (1963).
17. These are too boring to specify in the text. Briefly, the court can find that the parties
terminated the old agreement and made a new one; that "unexpected difficulties" in performance
constitute consideration for a new promise to pay more money for the same work; that the
parties had and settled a disputed claim; that the change was a waiver rather than a modification
and so does not need consideration.
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are too formalist, too timid, or too inclined to think that explicit policy
rationales are outside their province, she will address her argument to
law reform commissions or legislatures instead. 18
Surely almost all American lawyers would immediately recognize
this humdrum example for what it is, an exercise that they went
through a thousand times in their first year of law school. Indeed I
would suppose that this type of postrealist analysis - "Search for the
Latent Policy or Value and Make it Explicit" - has (in tandem with
the older classical mode of finding latent principles) been the overwhelmingly dominant mode of both scholarship and teaching since the
1940s. It is incredibly ironic that this method should now be condemned as "impractical," because the realist scholars who refined it all
believed that it would be far more useful to the practicing profession
than pure doctrinal analysis, both for prediction and reform. Advocates skilled at dredging up the latent factors could better guess how
courts were likely to decide. Judges and legislatures taught to recognize the functional purposes served by the rules they framed could
then revise the rules to make them serve those purposes more effectively. Most lawyers in this realist tradition have urged that the hidden policy and ethical bases of doctrine be more explicitly articulated,
both by courts and advocates in argument, so that lawyers could better
fit the rules to their appropriate applications. "Covert tools," as Karl
Llewellyn liked to say, "are never reliable tools." 19 The best of the
recent treatises - the sorts of treatises of which Judge Edwards thinks
we should have more2° - such as Areeda's Antitrust Law 2 1 and
Clark's Corporate Law, 22 make extensive use of extrinsic theory (economic theory, in these two cases) to order the discussion of cases and
to rationalize their results.
Once again, like old fashioned, classical Type # 1 analysis, this
method is not just for the hard case, but for every case; not just for
doctrine in the fringe areas of fading rules, emerging rules, and rulesin-con:tlict, but also, indeed especially, for the standard rules of everyday decisionmaking. In its initial conception in the 1920s and 1930s,
18. Such bodies have, of course, taken up that argument. U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (1990) abolished
the "preexisting duty rule" for contract modifications in sale-of-goods cases. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89(a) (1981) recommends that courts do the same in the general
common law.
19. Karl N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 703 (1939) (reviewing 0.
PRAUSNITZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND CONTI·
NENTAL LAW (1937)).
20. Edwards, supra note 1, at 43-44.
21. PHILLIP AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES
AND THEIR APPLICATIONS (1978 & Supp. 1992).
22. ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW (1986).
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it was not designed as a method exclusively or even primarily for an
audience of judges or lawyers practicing before judges. The realist
scholars, allied as most of them were to the Progressive movements
and ultimately the New Deal, wrote with some judges and practitioners in mind, notably Progressives like themselves: judges like Louis
Brandeis, Julian Mack, or Learned Hand; and reform-minded practitioners like Henry Stimson, Grenville Clark, Louis Marshall, Donald
Richberg, or Jerome Frank. But the main targets for policy scholarship were naturally the people who the scholars reasonably assumed
were taking over the job as the primary lawmakers in modem society
- legislators and administrators and the interest and advocacy groups
that thought up policy initiatives and helped draft the new statutes
and administrative rules. The return of even realist-influenced scholarship in the 1950s to a primary preoccupation with case law - even
though this was increasingly the body of case law interpreting the New
Deal statutes as well as common law - has been widely, and I think
correctly, interpreted as something of a retreat back towards formalism, a withdrawal from practical engagement with the real worlds of
politics and social conflict.23 To anyone schooled in the realist tradition, a lawyer who sticks exclusively to doctrine-talk is a lawyer who is
trying to avoid facing some important aspect of social reality.
One of the principal "law and" schools whose excessive influence
Judge Edwards expressly deplores - law and economics - is really
nothing more than an extended version of this familiar postrealist
method of policy analysis. I would guess that one of the reasons law
and economics has so rapidly and easily penetrated legal writing and
teaching is that it provides a somewhat more elegant and elaborate
method for doing what law teachers were doing already - digging out
the latent functions of legal rules and asking whether the rules in force
effectively serve them. Judge Edwards complains with some justice
that law-and-economics scholars have a single-minded fixation on the
norm of "efficiency." Their product will not be useful to a judge or
administrator who cannot choose an "efficient outcome" that violates
existing law. 24 But his complaint is surely overstated: "efficiency" in
some sense - if only that of reducing "transaction costs" or "deadweight losses" - is usually at least one of the norms or functions that
almost any legal rule might be thought to serve, even if it must be
balanced or traded off against some other norms. 25 If the notion of
23. See, e.g., LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE 1927-1960, at 188-231 (1986).
24. Edwards, supra note 1, at 47-48.
25. Judge Edwards acknowledges this point. Id. at 49 (stating that efficiency is "an important goal of many legal regimes").
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"efficiency" were coherent, if "efficient outcomes" were determinate,
and if the methods of law and economics could really identify those
outcomes - three admittedly rather large and improbable ifs surely knowing what such outcomes were would be very useful information for judges and administrators, even if applicable law told them
to consider other values as well.
I must admit my jaw dropped when I came to the part of Judge
Edwards' article that seems to argue that even law and economics is
not "practical."26 Has the whole recent past been just a bad dream?
My impression had been that in the 1980s the methods of law-andeconomics scholars, especially those of the Chicago School, had
marched upon and occupied huge areas of legal decisionmaking, especially in the federal executive, and had infiltrated many areas of judicial doctrine as well. President Reagan's executive orders required all
the agencies to do "cost-benefit" analyses; the Antitrust Division of
the Justice Department incorporated Chicago School antitrust theory
in its guidelines; environmental agencies shifted away from commandand- control regulation to economic-incentive-based standards; deregulation statutes shifted traditional regulated industries like trucking
and airlines out of regulation entirely into market regimes; the Bureau
of Economics at the Federal Trade Commission seized power from the
Bureau of Consumer Protection; tort reforms premised on economic
analysis were widely proposed, as were "cafeteria" plans of educational and health providers competing with one another other for consumer votes, and still other plans to privatize virtually every remaining
public function. Leading law-and-economics scholars were elevated to
the federal bench and administrative agencies, which they found very
congenial platforms for the application of their theories. This particular "law and" enterprise has become, in Bruce Ackerman's terms, a
"new language of power."2 7
One could certainly wish, as I fervently do, that it were not so
pervasive; that those who used it had a keener sense of its flaws and
limits than most of them seem to have; that they were more aware of
how manipulable economic analysis is, and how many undefended empirical and value assumptions it makes, how annoyingly it drives out
other normative concerns, how utterly pernicious its use can be if not
informed by any larger social vision. But it is out there, no question
about it; no lawyer nowadays who deals with the regulatory state at
any level can afford to be ignorant of it. If we in the law schools do
26. See id. at 47-48.
27. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 3 (1984).
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not equip our students both to apply elementary economic analysis to
legal problems and to be critical consumers aware of its limits, we will
do a lousy job preparing them for practice. Even if many judges and
lawyers still hold positions in which they can afford to pay no attention to this discourse, if we follow their example we will not be able to
contribute anything to those milieux - health care, education, foreign
trade, torts, tax, health and safety, welfare, housing, labor, and environmental policy - where all the policy wonks are at least superficially :fluent in economic reasoning.
The appropriate check to the imperial spread of economic analysis
is not to ignore it or wish it were not there but to counter it with
critique and to educate ourselves and our students in alternative, nonChicago versions. Above all one should develop the capacity, which I
think is at present shockingly underdeveloped in the legal profession,
to engage in noneconomic, normative argument - arguments based
on appeals to morality, history, fairness, equity, community, selfdevelopment, and democracy - in short the kinds of discourse about
public values that lawyers were used to engaging in from the beginning
of the Republic, before legal discourse became dehydrated and technocratic. Why should we yield the monopoly on discussion of public
values to the economists?

Type # 3: Realist Empirical Science, or, Exploring the Contexts and
Effects of Legal Decisionmaking
Another of the legal realists' projects was the study of what they
called the "social determinants and effects" of legal regimes and professional practices. What social-environmental conditions are likely
to generate different kinds of legal rules and practices?28 What social
consequences are likely to follow from the adoption of one regime or
another? What are the actual social effects of the rules in force: how
do the officials or parties who are expected to enforce them translate
them into action, how do those rules affect the lives of the people subject to them?
I wish I could say that Type #3 scholarship was as widespread in
the legal academy as Types # 1 and #2 are. But of course it is not: it
remains to this day the most neglected and ridiculously undervalued
as well as the most potentially fruitful branch of legal studies. Judge
Edwards does not even mention it. Yet there has been significant progress in this area in recent years. The Law & Society Association,
28. See generally KALMAN, supra note 23; John H. Schlegel, American Legal Realism and
Empirical Social Science: From the Yale Experience, 28 BUFF. L. REv. 459 (1979).
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which carries on the empirical social research project of Realism, is
flourishing. Social-legal history, perhaps especially the history of the
law oflabor relations, has entered a golden age. 29 Several fields oflaw,
which until recently scholars rarely studied in social context, have begun to develop rich empirical literatures: in labor law, studies of the
enforcement of "unfair labor practice" standards,30 of changing workplace relations, and shop-floor practices; 31 in administrative law, studies of how agencies actually make decisions; 32 in bankruptcy law,
studies of what happens to companies that go through chapter 11; 33 in
employment discrimination, studies of the effectiveness of general job
ability testing34 and of the social and legal causes of gender segregation;35 in procedure, studies of litigation rates36 and of settlement regimes;37 in criminal law, studies of the kinds of crimes and criminals
that are likely to bring on the death penalty38 and of the sentencing of
white- collar offenders39 - to mention just a handful.
This work, needless to say, is not doctrinal. It does not directly
supply any laWYer with "authoritative materials" for argument before
a court. But at the same time it is intensely practical. A lawyer advising a business contemplating reorganization would surely do well to
consult empirical work that suggests whether going through such a
painful and costly procedure is likely to do his client any good. A
lawyer advising an interest group seeking judicial review of an administrative rule could learn a lot from studies of what is likely to happen,
29. For an excellent sample of this new work, see LABOR LAW IN AMERICA: HISTORICAL
AND CRITICAL EssAYS (Christopher L. Tomlins & Andrew J. King eds., 1992).
30. See, e.g., PAUL c. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE (1990).
31. See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 73 (1988).
32. See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY
(1990); THOMAS 0. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY
ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY (1991).
33. See, e.g., Philip Shuchman, Social Science Research on Bankruptcy, 43 RUTGERS L. REV.
185, 186 n.1, 189 n.10, 216 n.122 (1990) (reviewing TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., As WE FOR·
GIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA (1989)).
34. See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Concepts ofDiscrimination in "General Ability" Job Testing, 104
HARV. L. REV. 1157 (1991).
35. See, e.g., Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empirical Study of the Lack ofInterest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1073 (1992).
36. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't
Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA
L. REV. 4 (1983).
37. See, e.g., Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study ofSettlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991).
38. DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY (1990).
39. STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE·
COLLAR CRIMINALS (1988).

August 1993]

The Middle Ground

2087

or not happen, if the decision is remanded to the agency. A lawyer
working on labor law reform legislation needs to know whether the
approach she favors is likely to help or hurt the cause she supports. A
lawyer representing a black defendant who is accused of a capital
crime and is trying to choose between going to trial and copping a plea
might want to know that, if convicted, his client is less likely to receive
a death sentence if the murder victim was black. A judge drafting a
remedial order might find it useful to learn that previous orders of the
same kind have been wholly ineffectual. The many lawyers and politicians debating the "litigation explosion" could profit immensely from
studies that - if they only paid attention to them - would tend to
disabuse them of the widespread belief that tort plaintiffs are overwhelming the courts with frivolous and excessive claims.
Now I am not, I hope, a positivist naif. Empirical social study - I
include history and ethnography - is never going to yield lawlike regularities that can make law practice into some sort of exact predictive
science. Social science is a value-soaked, fuzzy, messy, dispute-riddled, political enterprise like any other interpretive activity - like
law, for instance. But unless it is total hack work or ideological claptrap, the sketch maps it draws are better than nothing - and nothing
about the actual workings of the legal system is what the traditional
doctrinal education typically provides. If you were about to be posted
as a diplomat to some foreign country, wouldn't you first want to read
up on it - through histories, ethnographies, travelers' reports, statistical studies, literary accounts - even knowing that the actual experience of living and working there will eventually revise all the
impressions you got from your reading? The reading gives you an orientation, a starting point, some categories through which to begin
processing the experience. So if I had the power - which of course I
do not except insofar as I can influence students who then go into law
teaching - to redirect legal scholarship, I would use it to try to promote more empirical work, institutional description, and law-in-action
studies. Sometimes I think I would happily trade a whole year's worth
of the doctrinal output turned out regularly by smart law review editors and law teachers for a single solid piece describing how some
court, agency, enforcement process, or legal transaction actually
works. 40
40. In areas like criminal law and procedure, where doctrinal work has retained a near monopoly of legal academic effort, the field is on the verge of becoming a wasteland because the
doctrines, and the assumptions and categories underlying them, have so little connection with
anything that is important to preventing or controlling crime or dealing with criminals. My
colleague Robert Weisberg has made a powerful argument for irrigating the wasteland with insights drawn from scholarship in collateral fields like philosophy and, especially, criminology.
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My law school, for example, sends most of its graduates into largefirm corporate practice. We can and do teach them a lot of corporate
law doctrine, and some economics as well. But in the present state of
scholarship, none of us can give the students much of anything reliable
to read that provides thorough, systematic descriptions and reflective
analyses of what it is that corporate lawyers actually do, of the ways in
which lawyers negotiate their work task and its boundaries with their
clients and then translate client demands into work product, and of
the strategic and ethical choices lawyers constantly have to make. 41
There is certainly almost nothing written on a subject about which the
organized bar, indeed any reflective practitioner, ought to know a lot
- the likely social effects of different kinds of law practice. If we do
not know - at a bit more demanding level of "knowing" than we can
achieve from personal experience or hearing the stories our friends tell
- what lawyers do, how can we evaluate whether it could be done
better or is worth doing at all?

Type #4: "Critical" Legal Scholarship
Judge Edwards is especially severe on the category that includes
critical legal studies (CLS), feminist theory, and critical race
scholarship.
The CLS scholar does not demonstrate how authoritative texts constrain
and guide a governmental decision. Rather, quite typically, the CLS
scholar purports to "show" the opposite: that the texts are "indeterminate." This exercise is "impractical" because it seeks to show that the
existing legal system is fundamentally flawed. At its best, CLS usefully
See Robert Weisberg, Criminal Law, Criminology, and the Small World ofLegal Scholars, 63 U.
COLO. L. REV. 521 (1992).
41. There is very little as yet written about law firms that gives a good feel for how market
and organizational structures, career patterns, professional self-images, firm cultures, financial
pressures, patronage networks, and power hierarchies - running from clients to partners and
partners to associates - condition how lawyers see their jobs, self-interest, loyalties, obligations,
and practical moralities, and how these conceptions play out in their work. For a wonderful
study of business corporations in this vein, see ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD
OF CORPORATE MANAGERS (1988). Fortunately legal sociologists have started to do first-rate
work on law firms. See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS
(1991); ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE
LARGE LAW FIRM (1988); Symposium on the Law Firm as a Social Institution, 37 STAN. L. REV.
271 (1985); Symposium, The Growth of Large Law Firms and Its Effect on the Legal Profession
and Legal Education, 64 IND. L.J. 423 (1989). Some very exciting studies of lawyer-client interactions have appeared. See, e.g., KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME
(1985); William L.F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat, Enactments of Power: Negotiating Reality and
Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1447 (1992); Austin Sarat &
William L.F. Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk in the Divorce Lawyer's
Office, 98 YALE L.J. 1663 (1989). Louis Auchincloss' novels may still be the best introduction to
law firm culture, though most of them predate the present phase. See, e.g., LOUIS AUCHINCLOSS,
A LAW FOR THE LION (1953); LoUIS AUCHINCLOSS, THE PARTNERS (1974); LOUIS AUCHIN·
CLOSS, POWERS OF ATTORNEY (1963).
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questions and challenges the political premises that serve as the foundation of our system of justice; at its worst, CLS is hopelessly destructive
because it aims to disrupt the accepted practice of judges, administrators
and legislators with no prescriptions for reform.42

Edwards later adds that "[t]he nihilist scholar, who believes that
texts are infinitely plastic and subjective, can only teach students to
destroy legal texts, not to construct them."43 This picture of "critical"
scholarship is wildly distorted, but its misconceptions are so widespread that they deserve more than a short answer. To begin, Judge
Edwards' account seems contradictory: it tells us that a method pointing out fundamental flaws in the existing legal system is "impractical"
by definition but then concedes such a gadfly function is "useful." I
should think so, irideed: a radical critique of existing law is not invalid
because it is radical, so long as it is true. If the legal system or aspects
of it are in fact fundamentally flawed, the exposure of those flaws is a
signal public service - regardless of whether the critic happens to
have a basketful of remedies immediately at hand. One does not have
to refrain from pointing out the house is burning before the fire brigade arrives.
Judge Edwards' critique here as elsewhere partly derives from his
formalism and his judge-centeredness. To the extent judicial discourse
remains formalist, lawyers must argue before courts as if existing doctrine constrains the legal solution they seek: they must say the "law"
dictates the result they want even if they know perfectly well that it is
consistent with a wide range of possible results - which is usually the
case if the legal issues are seriously disputed. As I said earlier, just
because judges and advocates are compelled by their roles to accept
this fiction, I do not see why scholars should be. Other legal roles
have fewer constraints. The constraints before administrators framing
a rule or order de novo are not very strait ones due to the agency's
usually rather broad and vague statutory delegation. Before legislatures the constraint of existing "authoritative texts" mostly disappears
altogether: 44 petitioners may and often do criticize existing law with
abandon and recommend any revision they think sensible - within
the very broad limits set by plausible constitutionality.
Anyway, Judge Edwards' view of the "practical" would seem to
42. Edwards, supra note 1, at 47 (citation omitted).
43. Id. at 59.
44. Judge Edwards points out that even the legislature needs pointers on doctrine, the "existing legal regime." Id. at 55. But he adds that it also needs to know how the law "has failed in
the past," id., and that "the 'practical' scholar shows, inter alia, how the legal regime works," id.
at 56, without noting the evident fact that only empirical, not doctrinal, inquiry can address some
of the crucial questions.
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restrict scholars to recommending only those changes that current
decisionmakers would be likely to accept, in the language that those
decisionmakers like to use. Most scholars - in my view unfortunately
- already accept these restrictions. But legal scholars have never tied
themselves down to immediately realizable reforms, and they should
not start now. For the first third of our century, Progressive scholars
- and a few dissenting judges - kept on patiently plugging for social
legislation and for constitutional law protecting dissident speech and
expanding the powers of national government, programs that often
had not a prayer of being accepted by a hostile judiciary. For the
second third of the century, scholars like Fleming James and Friedrich
Kessler kept arguing for programs such as expanded enterprise liability and no-fault auto accident plans that at the time had little or no
support from any branch of government. In the 1980s, many scholars
continued to argue for the justice and wisdom of expanding liberal
programs such as affirmative action in the face of the resolute antagonism of the federal executive and, increasingly, the federal judiciary.
So who, or what, is the audience for such arguments? In many instances the audience is not current officialdom at all, but social movements and public-interest groups who are trying to change the political
agenda. For such movements, scholarship that documents the flaws in
existing systems can be a very practical instrument indeed.45
But let us return to Judge Edwards' main point against "critical"
scholarship: that it "destroys" legal texts by showing their plasticity,
without constructing anything positive. First of all, as I have already
suggested, the view that legal texts are "indeterminate" in some sense
is no invention of CLS, but has been shared by most of the dominant
modes of antiformalist legal thought, from Holmes through the legal
realists and their successors. In any first-year classroom in the country, one can find basic instruction in postrealist legal method, in which
students learn how cases and statutes may be read broadly or narrowly: how the force of a precedent may be limited to its peculiar
facts or expanded into a statement of broad principle; how a legal rule
45. Of course sometimes the audience for the most innovative scholarship is more diffuse still
- what one might call the inchoate public conscience or as yet unformed public opinion. One of
the functions of scholarship is to float out onto the airwaves modes of thinking about law and
policy that are unfamiliar and unconventional, not now part of anybody's agenda, though they
someday may be. I can see why this sort of work might be called "impractical." But when one
looks at the origins of major changes in law and public policy, one often finds them in intellectual
or theoretical movements that at the moment of their first utterances were neither welcomed nor
comprehended. When Jeremy Bentham's views on the reform of evidence law were published in
1827, for example, see JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE, SPECIALLY
APPLIED TO ENGLISH PRACTICE (London, Hunt & Clarke 1827), he was ridiculed and largely
ignored. In recent decades his reform program has largely been adopted, and lawyers who have
never heard of him accept his ideas as their conventional wisdom.
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may be read as a bright-line decisional rule or as an illustration of a
broad standard; how a statute or constitutional clause may be construed by means of textual literalism or historical intentionalism, or
dynamically as a charter of broad purposes whose applications will
evolve over time and adapt to changing circumstances. Thus the view
that the authoritative materials do not compel particular results but
may support arguments for a range of results is inherent in utterly
conventional, noncritical legal method. 46 After demonstrating to his
audience - his students or readers of his articles - various alternative readings of the doctrine, what should the law teacher do? One
choice is to fall back on convention: "Most jurisdictions say X." Another is to try to identify some policy or value subtext that will resolve
the ambiguity; or to identify some of the competing policies or values
that might be "balanced" to resolve it - perhaps some trade-off of
"efficiency" or "security of expectations" against "avoiding gross
unfaimess." 47
What do "critical" scholars do? We need not waste time on the
charge that. they believe that legal texts are "infinitely plastic and subjective," since no critical scholar has ever, anywhere, argued anything
of the kind. One of the things they do is simply to amplify ordinary
postrealist legal analysis into a more systematic method. They make
inventories of the standard types of doctrinal and policy argument that
are conventionally deployed in their legal fields. 48 In contract law, to
cite an example at random, one may construct the intentions of parties
by using a formal "objective" test that standardizes meanings of terms
across contexts, or by a very particularized inquiry into the parties'
past and present dealings and trade customs.49 The usual policy reasons for choosing one method or the other are reasons like: "The for46. Just to clarify: To say this is not to deny that at any given time most cases are "easy
cases" in the sense that most lawyers will be able correctly to predict the outcome. But that
predictability is not somehow an inherent property of the legal texts: it results rather from the
fact that authoritative readings of the texts have led, for the time being at least, to a relatively
stable and widely shared conventional reading. That convention may, however, be "destabilized" by repeated challenges - or just by shifts in other doctrines or public or legal opinion that make it seem no longer plausible. For over 50 years, for example, conventional legal and
public opinion supposed that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was
perfectly consistent with state-mandated racial segregation. Any lawyer who tried to argue
otherwise was impatiently dismissed. When John W. Davis undertook to argue Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), for the Southern states he assumed it was a slam-dunk, easy case.
He was, of course, wrong by a zero to nine vote margin.
47. The teacher's balancing might not always be the same as the legal convention: "Most
jurisdictions say X, but the 'better view' is Y."
48. Incidentally - something that ought to please Judge Edwards - most "critical" teaching is intensively doctrinal.
49. See generally 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 7.9-.10, at 502-14 (3d ed.
1990).
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mal test ensures predictable and uniform outcomes in litigation and is
cheap and easy to apply," "The informal inquiry is more likely to effectuate the actual intentions of the parties," and so on and so forth.
Critical teachers have students practice making the typical doctrine
and policy arguments, along with the typical counterarguments, in
every case. The students see that the system has argumentative resources that present varying possibilities for the resolution of every
legal issue. Legal and policy discourses are not determinate, but
neither are they "infinitely plastic and subjective": they are highly
constrained by the available stock - though creative lawyering of
course may always expand that stock - of argument types coexisting
in patterned oppositions. The opposing arguments often reflect deep
conflicts between social visions: divergent views of efficiency, distributive fairness, the obligation we should have to look out for one another, and the meaning of "consent" under conditions of need or
subordination.
The differences between this "critical" method and Judge Edwards' ideal education are instructive. Judge Edwards writes:
[A] doctrinal education is a crucial part of the lawyer's ethical development. The ethical lawyer should only advance reasonable interpretations of the authoritative texts - interpretations that are plausible from
a public-regarding point of view. The ethical lawyer's brief should be
reasonably true to those texts, and to the public values they embody.
This is what law schools must teach, for it appears that law firms no
longer can. The doctrinal capacity - the capacity to develop and communicate a true understanding of some legal regime - is a necessary
condition for ethical practice. 50

There is much in this formulation to admire, especially as it amounts
to a major qualification of Judge Edwards' formalist position though he steals a base over to formalism in the slide from "reasonable" and "plausible" into "true understanding." Here the judge recognizes that interpretations of the authoritative texts may vary, and
that the choice among variations requires attentiveness to "public values" - that is, values of morality and policy. So far, so good: legal
decisionmaking implicates questions of value and sound policy; lawyers should be aware of public values and promote them in their work
of representing clients. The gap between Judge Edwards and the "critical scholars" opens with his implication that a "true" interpretation
will yield a single correct answer. To the "critics" it seems awfully
implausible that greatly contested issues of ethics and utility, in a pluralist polity whose groups and individuals pursue diverse and often
SO. Edwards, supra note 1, at 59.
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incommensurable goods, should be capable of optimally correct resolution through the craft techniques of legal analysis. That is not a
reason for refusing to try to resolve these issues, for lawyers and legal
decisionmakers make value choices even when they try not to choose,
as when they fall back upon prevailing conventional formulae and pretend they have no other option.
When the Judge says "critical" scholars do not try to "construct"
legal texts, he must mean that they do not teach and write as if the
doctrine, or rather the doctrine informed by attention to "public values," could yield uniquely correct answers. He is certainly right about
that. Yet I confess I would think myself horribly incompetent at the
purely "practical" job of training lawyers if I failed to show my students how to identify, and base arguments on, the many different types
of doctrinal and policy reasoning that judges and lawyers employ
every day: broad and narrow readings of precedent and statute; formal and informal methods of interpretation; variant strategies for constructing the intentions or capacity for foresight of criminals, testators,
contracting parties, and tortfeasors; and different economic arguments
- often, in fact, completely contradicting one another as one moves
from one case or context to another - about what kinds of property
rights, liability standards, or damage rules will deliver the right mixture of incentives to encourage optimal amounts of production or precaution. I teach the standard variations of and contradictory
responses to the stock legal arguments largely because they exist out
there in the world and practitioners make use of them. I did not make
them up out of some fiendish motive to discredit the legal system. If I
were a judge with a formalist conception that my role required suppressing what seem to me the obvious facts of variation and contradiction in legal discourse in order to make the doctrinal universe appear a
(mostly) seamless and harmonious whole, I guess I would swallow
hard and do it. But I am not. In fact I am happy, not at all upset,
about the marvelous diversity of the doctrinal and policy universe of
legal discourse, because it means that I can, in total good faith, teach
my students that we are not all stuck with the current stock of conventional answers to legal questions. We can all find plenty of resources
in perfectly ordinary modes of legal discourse to urge improvements
on the existing legal constitution of society.
"Critical" scholars do recommend improvements all the time: I
am always taken aback by the charge that they just trash the going
system, that they are "nihilists" who tear down without trying to con-
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struct. 51 I could illustrate this by citing almost any major piece of
CLS, feminist, or critical race scholarship. I will limit myself to just
one, an exemplary exercise in the CLS mode: Joseph Singer's article,
The Reliance Interest in Property. 52 Singer's piece is about a case in
which the Youngstown local of the steelworkers union sought damages from U.S. Steel for closing down the plant where the local's members had worked. 53 The steelworkers stated a claim based on
"promissory estoppel" 54 that they had worked extra hard and given up
concessions in reliance on the company's assurances that it would keep
the plant open if its operations could be made profitable. The Sixth
Circuit held the company not liable, as probably most courts in
America would have done: the steelworkers' theory was just not on
the map of existing conventional arguments in this context. Singer
devotes the piece to showing that, despite the conventional wisdom of
the legal system, the outcome was hardly inevitable or foreordained by
the terms of legal discourse viewed from a larger perspective. He conducts an exhaustive review of legal and policy arguments commonly
made in analogous areas of property, tort, and contract doctrine to
show that the legal system often supports reliance-based claims very
similar to those of the steelworkers. He then discusses and shows the
weaknesses and problems of the policy arguments often made to dismiss such claims - or legislation to restrict closings - in plant-closing contexts like the one at issue. He shows that the arguments used
to distinguish plant closings rest upon unexamined and unsupported
ideological and empirical premises about the natural justice and economic efficiency of a "property right" in employers to close plants at
will. He concludes by recommending recognition of employee reliance
interests in these and many similar situations. Singer, in short, uses
the standard doctrinal and policy resources of legal discourse itself to
51. Judge Edwards, I regret to say, cites no examples of the "nihilist" tendencies he deplores.
52. Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988).
Singer's title echoes, of course, one of the great articles of doctrinal scholarship: Lon L. Fuller &
William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pts. 1 & 2), 46 YALE L.J. 52,
373 (1936-1937). Fuller and Perdue's article would seem to break many of Judge Edwards' rules
for "practical" scholarship. It cites a lot of cases, to be sure, but it is also heavily theoretical and
interdisciplinary. Its subject is not hard cases but ordinary cases. It draws on a lot of Continental law and learning. It does not accept the law "as it is" - that is, as judges then expounded it.
Rather, in a combination of classical (Type :fl: 1) and realist (Type #2) modes, it boldly proposes
a total reconceptualization of the foundations of contract liability, from a promise-based to a
tortlike reliance-based liability. It is also one of the most influential law review articles ever
written, one that prompted major revisions in the way judges and the practicing bar routinely
think about contract law.
53. Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir.
1980).
54. 631 F.2d at 1269. For a current statement of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, see
REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 90 (1979).
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open up for reexamination and critique the current predictable, conventional wisdom of the legal system. He shows that what may at first
seem like an unacceptably "radical" interpretation of law has deep
roots in traditional legal norms and practices. In a political climate
more favorable to labor than when the piece was written, 1988,
Singer's piece would - and maybe will? - be a big help to the labor
bar and to any legislature considering plant-closing legislation.
One more note - I promise, only one - about "critical" scholarship. Judge Edwards tells us that adherents of "law and" and "critical" movements have a "low regard" for the practice of law and that
their "disdain" for practice leads them to produce impractical scholarship. Again he mentions no names or examples, so it is hard to know
exactly whom or what he's talking about. But I do know this much:
"critical" scholars are intensely interested in practice. As previously
mentioned, they teach a lot of doctrine; they teach the critical methods
of doctrinal and policy argument outlined above in part because they
believe it is a valuable skills training; and they teach a lot of law and
economics because they believe that students who do not know how to
make, and see through, economic arguments will be disempowered in
the real world of policy formation. In their law schools they can usually be found leading the fight - often alas against their traditionbound, doctrinally oriented colleagues - for more extensive clinical
education. Most of them are active in practice themselves - as public
interest advocates, clinical supervisors, legal ethics reformers and bar
regulators, and advisors to legal services clinics. Above all, they have
produced an extensive body of scholarship on law practice, much of it
addressed specifically to lawyers already in practice or about to enter
it.ss Of course the practices in which critical scholars are mostly interested are "progressive" practices - legal services, community organizing, lawyering for social movements or advocacy groups, civil
rights, and civil liberties - but the last time I checked that type of law
55. See, e.g., GERALD P. LoPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF
PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992); LUBAN, supra note 8; Abel, supra note 8; Ruth Buchanan
& Louise G. Trubek, Resistances and Possibilities: A Critical and Practical Look at Public Interest Lawyering, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 687 (1992); Peter Gabel & Paul Harris,
Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369 (1982-1983); Duncan Kennedy, The Effect of the Warranty of
Habitability on Low Income Housing: "Milking" and Class Violence, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 485
(1987); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Legacy of Clinical Education: Theories About Lawyering,
29 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 555 (1980); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View ofNegotiation:
The Structure of Power Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv. 754 (1984); Simon, Visions, supra note 8;
Symposium, Theoretics of Practice.· The Integration of Progressive Thought and Action, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 717 (1992); Louise G. Trubek, Critical Lowyering: Toward a New Public Interest
Practice, 1 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 49 (1991); Lucie White, Representing "The Real Deal," 45 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 271 (1990); Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, supra note 8.
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practice was as real as any other. Moreover, some critical scholars
write about business-law practice as well. The bottom line is: "critical" scholars are as practically oriented as any, and more than most.
Judge Edwards should be embracing them as allies.
Type # 5: Theory

Judge Edwards is pretty skeptical about "theoretical" legal scholarship, though he thinks there is a useful function for theory in helping
to resolve "hard cases" in the fringe areas. He is also willing to tolerate some role for it in scholarship and teaching, even though he believes that role has grown too relatively large. The lawyers in his
survey sample are more robustly antiintellectual, some drawing a firm
line between "theoretical" and "practical" work and dismissing the
former as utterly useless.
I will not try to make an extended case for the practical value of
theory. The whole "theory-practice" distinction strikes me as unutterably daffy. The point of theory is to clarify and inform practice: if it
does not, it is just bad theory. As Holmes put it:
Theory is the most important part of the dogma of the law, as the architect is the most important man who takes part in the building of a house.
The most important improvements in the last twenty-five years are improvements in theory. It is not to be feared as unpractical, for, to the
competent, it simply means going to the bottom of the subject. 56

Of course there are many aspects of law practice, like all other social
practices, that are neither readily theorized or susceptible to being
learned via theoretical approaches. Much of law practice is like a language, or a craft skill like (to use Stanley Fish's example57 ) Dennis
Martinez's pitching ability: the only way to learn it is through practice, on the job, as an apprentice to someone who does it well. Just as
much practice cannot be theorized, much academic theory is surely
useless to practitioners. 58 I hardly count theory as useless, however, if
56. HOLMES, supra note 13, at 200-01.
57. Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773 (1987).
58. Since I have reproached Judge Edwards for not giving examples of the trends he deplores, I should mention some types of theory that one can find in today's law reviews that strike
me as, if not always useless, not very useful. With hesitation then, and fearfully assuming the
risk that defenders of these types of work will undoubtedly find me an arrogant, prejudiced,
ignorant lout, here is my list: public choice theory; hyperformal economic models of optimal
liability and damage regimes; almost the entire "efficiency of the common law" literature; Bayesian approaches to nonstatistical evidence; most legal applications of sociobiology; narratives of
the "authentic experience" of subordinated peoples not actually drawn from relations or ethnographies of any of those peoples; total systems of legal rights constructed from first principles of
purportedly natural law; jurisprudential literatures asking "What is Law?"; highly abstract general theories of the legal process - for example, of the ideal relationship between courts and
legislatures unconnected to any historical experience of actual courts and actual legislatures;
purportedly historical interpretations of legal texts for modern use that ignore all intervening
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it helps one understand social reality, even if it does not also help one
manipulate it. After all, making sense of social life and finding meaning in the human condition is in itself a practical, instrumental activity, one into which all cultures pour a lot of effort and imagination in
the course of their development, long before they discover the delights
of making money.
But although some law practices may be theory-resistant, and
some legal theory irrelevant to any conceivable legal practice, law as it
is actually and ordinarily practiced is loaded with theoretical assertions and preconceptions. It uses highly abstract models of the world
that structure perceptions, frame conceptions of legal -and factual
problems and their appropriate resolution, and help explain and justify
the world and what lawyers do in it. Sometimes these models are inarticulate or semiarticulate; but quite often - because one of our profession's basic operational modes is after all ra~ional argument and
justification - they are out in the open, and at least lightly intellectualized. Sometimes indeed one can trace directly the theoretical
presuppositions of practitioners - whether or not the practitioners
themselves are aware of this fact - to some more formal body of theory originally developed by intellectuals. 59
Moreover, law is a profession whose own norms require it periodically to reform and refresh its practices through theoretically selfaware critique. That is, the critical scrutiny of what lawyers do, the
attempt to find a basis in principle for what they do, and the reform of
the practices to conform more closely to the principles are all intrinsic
to the practice of law itself. For this reason I think that accounts of
legal practices that distinguish too sharply between perspectives that
are "internal" to the profession, such as those of the practitioner or
judge, and perspectives that are "external," such as those of the anthropologist, are overdrawn. The external perspectives may be and
history between the text's enactment and the present; purely doctrinal approaches to legal fields,
such as criminal procedure, in whose actual administration doctrine plays a very small part;
many articles with extensive cites to the work of Jacques Derrida or making extensive use of
"postmodern" as a descriptive or explanatory category; and more generally any other theoretical
approaches that seem neither to be built out of nor to have any plausible application to the way
human beings think and act and the way legal, social, and political institutions function. I am
willing to be talked out of any of these prejudices, if anyone wants to bother to try.
59. This link between inarticulate legal premise and theory is most obvious in the case of
economic theory. The doctrine of the late nineteenth-century "classical" period in a great many
fields - the law of competition and combination, labor law, public utilities, taxation, and constitutional limitations - was soaked in preconceptions derived from classical economic theory. In
the first decades of our century, these legal doctrines were modified to reflect the growing influence of marginalist theory and institutional economics. See generally HERBERT HovENKAMP,
ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937 (1991). In our own time of course, neoclassical
economic theory has colonized whole provinces of the legal system. See supra notes 26-27 and
accompanying text.
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often are instrumental to the internal projects of self-understanding
and reform.
What follows from adopting this view? What follows is an idealized view of the appropriate partnership between the bar and the
schools. The academics would (1) look at what the lawyers do, (2)
float to the surface the sunken theoretical and empirical suppositions
of lawyers' practices, (3) restate those suppositions in elegant and wellorganized forms, (4) examine them critically in terms of whatever
legal and nonlegal perspectives - legal science, social science, history,
political theory, feminist theory, literary theory, ethics - seem to shed
any light, (5) generate prescriptions for reform, or reasons why reform
will not work, 60 and finally - only of course if this is feasible, if the
reform ideas have reached the stage of potential practical adoption (6) form alliances with reformers - bar groups, judges, policy institutes, public interest advocates, social movements, and legislators to translate the ideas into action. Lawyers and officials would then
experiment with the new ideas in their practices, and the cycle would
begin anew.

III.

FISSURES IN THE MIDDLE GROUND

This sunny and rational scheme for dividing professional labor
would take maximum advantage of the scholars' comparative advantage. They are not usually so highly specialized as lawyers, at least
corporate lawyers, have to be these days. They are not in so much of a
hurry. They can take the time to locate a legal rule, such as a section
of the tax code, in the overall structure of the tax law and its overarching principles and economic purposes. They can compare it with practices in other legal cultures and put it in historical perspective.
Because they are part of a university, have access to colleagues in
other fields and increasingly have some interdisciplinary training
themselves, they can use the theories and methods of other disciplines
to help restate and evaluate the hidden nonlegal agenda of the legal
system, its ideological, economic, empirical, and ethical premises.
They can also design and carry out studies assessing the system's social effects. What they lack in actual experience of practice they can
partially compensate for in detachment. Because they have the luxury
of not having to please clients or to depend on current modes of prac60. I add this caveat because sometimes the academic contribution may take the very useful
form of suggesting that, although the existing practice is theoretically incoherent and practically
flawed because it has many unfortunate side effects, it is a tolerable second·best solution, and
attempts to change it are likely to make matters even worse. The academics may also conclude
that the flawed practice is the result of long-term environmental conditions beyond the capacity
of any reform agency to alter in any significant way.

August 1993]

The Middle Ground

2099

tice to make a living, they can be critical and reformist. The five types
of scholarship outlined above would seem on the whole to meet the
demands of the utopian vision. That is, they both nicely exploit the
comparative advantage of legal scholars and supply advice that is, in
the broad ways that I have outlined, "practical" to actors in the legal
system.
What then has gone wrong? Why have judges and lawyers like
Judge Edwards and his survey sample become so sour about legal
scholarship? Why do they see such wide rifts and gullies opening up
on what should be the tranquil and cooperative "middle ground"
shared between scholars and practitioners?
Judge Edwards' answer, as we have seen, is that the scholars have
wandered off the middle ground by abandoning, or at least deemphasizing, the exposition of doctrine and doctrinal education, choosing
instead to do theoretical, interdisciplinary, and critical work oflittle or
no "practical" value to the profession. They have done this because,
increasingly lacking in practice experience themselves, they "disdain"
and have a "low regard" for the practice of law and therefore for work
that helps practitioners; they do the kind of work that the university
rather than the bar is likely to value and reward. Is the answer
plausible?
A. First of all, is the answer factually accurate?
Are legal scholars producing less doctrine? Ariela Gross searched
at my request the contents of three major law reviews61 in 1910 and
every tenth year thereafter, to sense historical trends; and of five major
law reviews 62 in the last five years, to sense current trends. What she
found is very interesting. 63 As one might expect, the share of total
61. CoLUM. L. REV., HARV. L. REV., YALE L.J.
62. CoLUM. L. REV., HARV. L. REV., STAN. L. REv., u. CHI. L. REV., YALE L.J.
63. Ariela Gross's research report summarizes her findings as follows: Several things are
evident from this survey of the contents of ninety years of law reviews: 1) the majority of the
pages of a law review have always been, and continue to be, devoted to doctrinal analysis, or, as
Judge Edwards would have it, "the law"; 2) a substantial portion of law review articles have
always been devoted to "theory," politics, history, or legal education.
The most obvious changes have been away from Langdellian categories of law - such as
"telegraph companies," or "oil and gas." But this trend began in the 1930s, and it is hardly a
cause for contemporary alarm. Substantively, articles have shifted away from common law topics and towards administrative law, public policy, corporate law, criminal procedure, labor law,
and constitutional law. The Yale Law Journal has been particularly heavy with constitutional
theory in the past several decades. But this emphasis also reflects shifts in legal practice, as well
as public attention to the Warren Court and its legacy. It is not what Judge Edwards discusses.
The article on a fairly specific topic - which either discovers a pattern in case law, or summarizes the trends in legal doctrines and then suggests where the future lies or proposes reforms
- is something of a historical constant. However, it is true that in the years between 1930 and
1960 this type of article was predominant in the law review, filling one-half to two-thirds of its
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contents taken up by doctrinal articles - defined here simply as articles that discuss a specific case, cases interpreting a statute, or a field of
law with a lot of cases cited- was highest in 1910. From then until
now, doctrinal articles make up the clear majority of contents. The
relative share of doctrine does dip slightly beginning in the 1920s, losing ground to pieces on theory, jurisprudence, and current issues of
public policy. Doctrine's share is lowest, interestingly, around 1950,
rising somewhat in 1980 and 1990. Within the doctrine category,
"narrow doctrine," the piece devoted to a very specific case or legal
issue, tends to predominate over "broad doctrine," the piece analyzing
broad categories of doctrine, until recent years. In the 1988-1992 sample, narrow and broad doctrine have about equal shares. Theoretical
or interdisciplinary articles with few or even no case citations were
common in the 1920s and 1930s - the height of the realist controversy. These types of articles have become still more common in the
last five years, averaging about six pieces per law review per year. The
share of history has remained both low - about two or three pieces,
five to ten percent, per review per year - and constant over the whole
period.
Our little sample is hardly scientific, and we could argue about its
method forever - which is why I am not bothering to describe it in
more than summary detail - but still it is better than a total vacuum.
What does it tell us? That doctrine is still the staple commodity, even
in the reviews edited at fancy schools that go in for the fancy new stuff.
Because the total number of law reviews has grown enormously, especially after the big expansion of law schools, and hence law reviews, in
pages. Yet, in years when there have been fewer narrow doctrinal articles, it was usually not
abstruse, theoretical articles that pushed them out, but broader, thematic articles, about "the
law." While these articles have changed a great deal over the century, from Beale's treatise
chapter on contracts to broad discussions of administrative agencies to school desegregation, the
goal is still to give an overview of a whole area of legal practice, critique it, and suggest paths for
the future. Thus, while the 1990 Columbia Law Review has only four out of eighteen narrow
doctrinal articles, seven more articles were broad overviews of substantive legal areas.
As for "theory," it has been alive and well for decades. While the Harvard Law Review did
not Jet much sneak in until 1960 or so, Columbia in 1920 and 1930, and Yale in 1910, 1920, 1940,
and 1950 have a large number of articles by proponents of sociological jurisprudence, legal real·
ism, and traditional legal science, as well as articles on completely "political" issues with almost
no "law" at all.
Also notable is the extent to which the category of "theory" has not "infected" the category
of doctrinal analysis. For example, the 1990 Yale Law Journal has an equal number of articles
on such theoretical topics as "community in constitutional theory," and "the Coase theorem" as
it does articles on "filling gaps in contracts" and "qui tam." The doctrinal articles do not appear
to take a conscious theoretical perspective, although that is not true of all Jaw review articles that
focus on a particular area of Jaw. The broader overviews of doctrine are much more likely to
state a viewpoint or theoretical framework, usually on a constitutional topic - in this issue,
affirmative action and sexual harassment (Title VII). In general, though, there is a surprising
paucity of articles that identified themselves as being "CLS," "critical race," "feminist" or any of
the other dread schools against which Judge Edwards inveighs.
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the 1970s and the growth thereafter of multiple journals at a single
school, the absolute volume of total doctrinal output must be far
vaster in 1993 than it has ever been. How much doctrine, one has to
wonder, does the bar want? Judge Edwards is certainly right, however, that doctrine has to share the stage with other types of work, and
that a modest proportion - about fifteen percent is my informal estimate - of total scholarly output is now devoted to theory and "law
and" work, incidentally much more usually non-"critical" than "critical" work (the latter is rare in our sample), which cites few or no
cases. The other main nondoctrinal category is that of pieces on current political and public policy issues. In our sample at least, there is
not a single piece that does not have something to do with law or legal
institutions or policy.
Is use by lawyers, including judges, legislators, administrators,
public interest lawyers, policy analysts, and advocates - of legal
scholarship declining? I cannot even begin to guess the answer. Judge
Edwards says "Yes," but the studies cited in his own footnotes do not
entirely support him. A very recent Stanford Law Review study of
citation practices found that judges and practitioners as well as professors continue to read law reviews, though chiefly for the purpose of
tracking current' developments in their practice specialties. While not
giving them rave notices, they believe that law reviews are moderately
successful at meeting their goals. 64 Judge Edwards' own survey
method has some serious problems. Law practice is now very specialized. A lawyer may spend all his time, even his career, representing
clients before a single agency, or advising them on four or five sections
of the tax code. Such a lawyer is obviously hardly ever going to find
articles in any general-purpose law review that bear immediately on
specific problems in his or her specialty. Instead, he or she will have
to go to specialized law reviews, in which most of the contributors are
practitioners, or officials, in his or her specialty, along with the occasional academic. A fairer and more revealing survey method might be
to look at the current contents of a law review to try to identify, or ask
the author to identify, the potential practitioner or policy audience for
each of the articles, including even the very "theoretical" ones; and
then to ask lawyers or policy wonks from the targeted audience to read
the piece and ask if they learned anything from it.
64. Max Stier et al., Law Review Usage and Suggestions for Improvement: A Survey of Attorneys, Professors, and Judges, 44 STAN. L. R.Ev. 1467 (1992). Though, like Judge Edwards, the
practitioner-respondents to this survey want less "theory" than they get, they would like more
"empirical" work. Id. at 1498.
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B. Assuming the truth of Judge Edwards' unproved thesis, why
don't practitioners want to read our stuff - especially our
theory, "law and" (interdisciplinary), or
"critical" stuff?

Judge Edwards says it is because we "disdain" them and do not
want to write for them; we write for each other and for the rest of the
university instead and award each other recognition and tenure by academic rather than professional standards. Is that right?
This assertion is clearly not entirely wrong. The judge has a legitimate beef about the reader-unfriendliness of many law review articles.
Sometimes they seem written for no one's consumption, unless perhaps
an alien's or a computer's. Like judicial opinions, they have become
unbearably long. In the great iconoclastic period of American legal
scholarship, the 1920s and 1930s, article writers said what they needed
to say in ten to thirty pages and then stopped. There is also undoubtedly a fringe - at an informal guess, a widening fringe - of articles
showing signs of infestation by scholastic diseases: jargon-laden, ingrown, self-referential quarrels within a narrowing clique. These
problems are serious. Some of our colleagues are in danger of writing
their way out of any readership save their friends and their tenure
committees.
Some of these vices, however, derive from our scholarly conventions of trying to write for generalist rather than specialist audiences.
Current articles are long and dull in part because their writers assume
no background knowledge in their readers. 65 Everything, from the
doctrinal and historical context to the meaning of elementary terms of
economic or critical analysis, has to be elaborately spelled out. That is
not how any real academic discipline operates. Legal scholars do not
have enough places where they can carry on internal conversations in
scholarly shorthand. 66 Their enterprise has grown ungainly, partly
from trying to address too many constituencies at once.
Yet clearly the most important of those constituencies remain the
managers of the legal system - judges, lawyers, legislators, administrators, policy and advocacy groups, social movements, and so forth.
To this day the overwhelming bulk of what appears in the law reviews
65. Judge Edwards' ideal product, doctrine-for-practitioners, would in today's practice conditions have to be highly specialized. No one article would be accessible or interesting to more
than a handful of readers. But at least it could take those readers' knowledge for granted.
66. The peer-review edited scholarly journals such as the Journal ofLegal Studies, Journal of
Law & Economics, Law & Society Review, Legal History Review, and so forth perform this function to some extent. If there were more such journals, scholars might use them more regularly
for their academic conversations and save the regular law reviews for communication to generalist and professional audiences.
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is the same as it ever was, what Judge Edwards calls "prescriptive"
scholarship, scholarship that makes a normative argument to some set
of hypothesized legal decisionmakers to analyze and address some
legal problem in the recommended way. Law review articles are, basically, briefs. Even scholarship at the "meta"-level, concerned with issues of theory and methodology, is mostly concerned to ask whether
we are going about this brief-writing enterprise the right way, using
the right tools of analysis, reasoning modes, values, and models of empirical reality. Think, for example, of all the articles on whether
judges interpreting the Constitution should rely on the framers' or ratifiers' original intent. It makes no sense to write prescriptively unless
one has some audience of practical actors in mind.
Is the law review writers' attitude one of "disdain" or "low regard" for the practical world that must carry out their plans? 67 On
the contrary, it is affectingly, even heartbreakingly, idealistic about
that world. The articles address a bench, bar, and officialdom that are
by hypothesis incredibly cosmopolitan, reflective, and high-minded.
They assume these hypothetical readers are keenly interested in understanding their practices and their conceptual and historical bases, in
refining their empirical and value premises and analytic tools, in exploring the possible bearings on their work of the latest insights from
other fields, in increasing the effectiveness of their work in serving valued social purposes; that they are deeply committed to reforming the
legal system, including if necessary their own practices, to the ends of
making it serve those purposes more efficiently and more justly. The
scholars seem to be writing for a society of practitioners with the renaissance erudition of Oliver Wendell Holmes; the eagerness to learn
from other disciplines of Jerome Frank, Richard Posner, or Ruth
Ginsburg; the historical depth of Leon Higginbotham; the public in67. Judge Edwards and his sample, see Edwards, supra note 1, at 61 n.73, infer generalized
"disdain" for the practicing profession from some law teachers' rhetorical use of adjectives like
"ridiculous" to describe examples of judicial or other real world legal practices. This is, of
course, the standard defense mechanism of intellectual lawyers against the practicing profession:
"They may have more money and power and macho real-world experience, but we are better at
legal reasoning." It is the exact counterpart to the ways in which practitioners speak of academics as "impractical," "ivory-tower intellectuals," "theorists who couldn't function in the real
world." Such antagonisms are commonplace between the intellectual and practicing branches of
any profession. In law, the antagonism begins after the first term of law school, when bright
students with fragile egos often feel inadequate and sometimes humiliated for the first time in
their lives, if not by Socratic bullying, by the way they have been graded. Some of this antagonism is inevitable; some could be avoided I think by restructuring legal education around a collaborative-clinical model of learning rather than a hierarchical sorting-and-ranking model. The
trouble is, the law firms want us to sort and rank.
If Judge Edwards wants to hear really disdainful talk about lawyers and judges, he should
drop by the bar nearest the courthouse. Nobody is more cynical about the legal profession than
practicing lawyers.
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terest practice ideals of Louis Brandeis or Charles Evans Hughes; the
doctrinal inventiveness of Benjamin Cardozo, Roger Traynor, or Shirley Abrahamson; the patrician reformism of Henry Stimson or Francis
Biddle; the intimate involvement in policy formation of Lloyd Garrison or David Lilienthal; and the passion for social justice of Thurgood
Marshall or Marian Wright Edelman. The lawyers they address are
modernized versions of the lawyerly ideal that prevailed in our founding period: the republican - or Ciceronian - lawyer-statesmen, well
schooled in history, political economy, and belles lettres; expert advisors on legal science to the bench and on legislative science to the
legislatures; and active in public causes, periodically on leave from
practice to public service. 68 No real lawyer, of course, could possibly
live up to every aspect of this ideal; though I know personally many
lawyers who come close on several dimensions, and I know by hearsay
and historical research of many more. But I doubt that anyone will
dispute that such lawyers are rare and, perhaps, in the current state of
practice, getting rarer. The point is that if most practitioners came
anywhere near the idealized view that legal scholarship assumes of
them, the practical relevance of that scholarship to their work would be
unmistakable - in all the ways I tried laboriously to demonstrate
above. 69
In fact I sometimes think that most legal academics - along with
judges, enforcement officials, retiring law firm partners in the old-fashioned lawyer-statesman mold, and social movement or public interest
lawyers - are among the few people left in their profession who take
law seriously, who believe that, for all the many flaws in its administration, the legal system embodies values and social purposes that deserve respect; and who therefore devote themselves with something
very like piety to its ethical rationalization and improvement. A lot of
practicing lawyers, on the other hand - though by no means all, for
as Judge Edwards notes there is a huge reservoir of repressed idealism
in the practicing profession - seem to regard law purely instrumentally, as a set of mechanisms and obstacles to manipulate strategically
and to work around for the benefit of clients, or as a game to be played
for the sheer thrill of winning. 70 I certainly do not mean to suggest
68. For an excellent account of the ideal in its early republican form, see ROBERT A. FERGU·
SON, LAW AND LETTERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1984).
69. See supra text accompanying notes 67-68.
70. One of the rather disturbing findings of the Stanford survey of law review use was that a
very low number, 11.6%, of the practicing lawyers ranked "To Evaluate the Effectiveness of
Existing Law or Alternatives" as their first or second objective in reading law reviews. Almost
two-thirds of the attorneys, 65.3%, did not rank that objective at all. Steir et al., supra note 64,
at 1486. I do not know whether these numbers better reflect the attorneys' lack of interest in how
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that law teachers are immune from the ordinary motives of self-interest and the distractions and corruptions of careerism: every occupation has its pathologies. But the dominant tone of scholarship is one
of earnest high-mindedness about the legal system, a sustained and
rather mystifying optimism. If anything, in my view, it is all much too
soft-edged and sunny, far too sparing of the dark and bitter realities of
legal institutions and the social worlds in which they work.
Judge Edwards' own article suggests an alternative set of explanations for the indifference of practitioners - still assuming, which we
do not know for sure, that they are indifferent - to legal scholarship:
namely, that lawyers these days are so harried and overworked, so
specialized, so intent on bustling for and pleasing clients and watching
the bottom line, that they have no time or inclination for any activity
that does not seem immediately convertible to potential profits.
Much of what legal scholars do, and should do, is therefore not
likely to be of much help to lawyers thus preoccupied. 71 Scholars aim
to make structural connections across practice specialties and doctrinal categories, for example to show the commonalities of tort, contract, property, competition, and labor rules. They aim to understand
the structural and historical determinants of legal policies and practices, to understand how these came to be the way they are. Firm
lawyers operating on little sleep and meeting close deadlines have no
time for that. Scholars inspired by the intellectual goals of simplicity
and elegance often try to reshuffie standard legal categories to meet
those goals. Lawyers who have invested years of craft experience in
learning the messy old categories will resist such changes. One of the
main roles of scholars is to use their leisure and independence in the
service of critique and reform of ongoing practices. Lawyers who
make their living or gain strategic advantages from those practices will
actively oppose proposals that may end up abolishing their sources of
livelihood altogether. Scholars often work at trying to make more effective the public purposes expressed in regulatory legislation - fighting discrimination, augmenting the countervailing power of labor,
attacking monopoly, increasing competition, protecting nonrenewable
resources, promoting employment or old-age security, and redistributing wealth. It is not hard to see why lawyers who represent regulated constituencies with opposing interests and who have gradually
soaked up the views of their corporate clients, will not welcome this
well the legal system works or the law reviews' failure to say anything interesting on that subject.
In either case, something is amiss here.
71. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 1, at 73: "Law firms have no right to complain that law
graduates are 'unskilled,' where those skills are simply used to maximize profit."
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kind of scholarship. 72
One does not have to be "disdainful" of or cynical about law practice to recognize these obvious facts. It is no secret that the elite bar
these days is experiencing something of a crisis of morale and selfesteem. Distinguished commissions of the American Bar Association
worry about its commercialization and declension from ideals of public service. 73 Judge Edwards himself has some very harsh words to say
about the current state of practice - that lawyers increasingly distort
facts and law, engage in strategic manipulation of procedure, neglect
public obligations, and are obsessed with making money. 74 This situation is not some inexplicable outbreak of moral failure: it has structural causes, largely in the increased competition that rising corporate
legal costs have promoted among firms. But it hardly promotes the
formation of a bar elite capable of serving as the idealized audience for
the intellectual insights and normative aims that legal scholars are best
equipped to produce.
Indeed, I speculate that some legal scholars have in recent years
begun to turn inward, to produce a more academic and self-referential
scholarship, and to experiment with postmodern modes far removed in
tone and spirit from the high-minded reformism of most prescriptive
argument, precisely because they guess that they are losing their practitioner audience - to the extent that they ever had one. 75 Some
scholars are saying, "Well, if you won't try to understand us, we'll fix
it so you can't." Some, of course, have lost confidence in the Enlightenment rational-understanding-leads-to-reform project altogether.
There is a fascinating recent literature - a sort of counterpart literature from the scholars' side to Judge Edwards' polemic - on the
problem of the audience for our work, doubting whether prescriptive
legal scholarship, on which we spend most of our time - and on
which the judge thinks we should spend almost all our time - does
any good for anyone. 16
72. One could argue that elite lawyers organized in large metropolitan law firms destroyed
their own capacity to serve the public service ideals of the profession quite early in our history,
when they made the fateful decision that they would exclusively represent the interests of one
particular faction of civil society: big business interests. Louis Brandeis, Woodrow Wilson,
Harlan Fiske Stone, and A.A. Berle are among the most eminent lawyers who have come to this
conclusion. For a lengthy description of the argument and its bases, see Gordon, Corporate Law
Practice, supra note 8.
73. See AMERICAN BAR AssN. COMMN. ON PROFESSIONALISM, ...... IN THE SPIRIT OF
PUBLIC SERVICE": A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM
(1986) (Stanley Commission Report).
74. Edwards, supra note 1, at 66-74.
75. The practitioners' complaint about legal scholars as unworldly, hypertheoretical airheads
is an ancient genre.
76. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167 (1990).
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Yet much of the inward-turning trend has been simply a function
of the politics of the 1980s. Legal academics are mostly pretty liberal
in politics. From 1980 to 1992, doctrinaire conservatives dominated
federal executive policymaking. The Congress was passive and in disarray, unreceptive to new policy initiatives. The federal courts were
increasingly conservative too. When one has little hope of influencing
anybody in power, one's work is likely to turn critical, theoretical, and
historical. Much of the concrete prescriptive work in this period was
turned out by conservative law-and-economics scholars who could be
confident there was a policy audience for it. 77 I would predict that,
during the Clinton years, many more scholars will be doing "policy"
- articles on health care and tort reform, labor policy, tax policy,
international trade, and urban policy. Public and private law doctrine
- though still the staple of our work - will be revitalized if ever
judges come to seem, once again, sympathetic listeners.
C. If the diagnosis of disturbances of the "middle ground" just
offered is correct, or nearly so, what is the remedy?
Here I believe Judge Edwards lets us down badly: the remedy, he
says, is more doctrinal education, especially teaching of the "reasonable," "ethical," and "true" interpretations of authoritative texts. 78
This education is what students want; it is what the bar needs.
First a word or two on the legal education points of Judge Edwards' argument. Most law students, like some of the alumni Judge
Edwards cites in his survey sample,79 always want more "doctrinal"
education, though their view of doctrine is not the same as the Judge's.
What they want is more "black-fetter" law - that is, clear and wellorganized presentations of rules in the style of the well-taught bar review cram course. This "doctrinal" education we do not need. 80 It
77. Compare some earlier periods. In the 1920s and 1930s, liberal scholars who wrote about
constitutional law spent most of their time slashing and ridiculing the judicial product. They
wrote off most of the elite corporate bar as hopelessly unreceptive to their policy ideas. They
targeted their "practical" stuff - concrete, constructive, policy·oriented scholarship - to the
lawyers they thought would listen, Progressive reformers and, ultimately, New Dealers. Indeed
they wrote a lot of the New Deal legislation. In the 1960s and 1970s, on the other hand, legal
scholarship was often "creative" doctrinal scholarship - in both public and private law. Common law courts were expanding contract and tort enterprise liability; constitutional courts were
multiplying new rights. There was an easy symbiosis among the academy, activist courts, and
social movements, as there had been among realist scholars, Progressive, and New Deal
reformers.
78. See Edwards, supra note 1, at 57-66.
79. See, e.g., id. at 60 n.71.
80. I should qualify: some legal subjects are probably most efficiently taught through simple
transmission, perhaps via programmed learning, of doctrinal rules. Such subjects are now taught
very inefficiently by the case method, in which the rules have to be laboriously extracted and
refined from a mass of detail in the cases.
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takes all the patience and care law teachers possess to try to show
students that just learning rules is of limited use; that one has to learn
also how to select the right rule for a case among conflicting rules, to
apply rules to facts, to interpret rules and factual narratives and to
argue contrary interpretations; and that these skills in turn require
some grasp of principles, policies, and the importance of contextual
variation. I have found over the years that a teacher can indeed move
students away and above the black-letter law and to recognize the importance of theory, social context, and policy, so long as she does so in
the setting of concrete case situations. 81 In those situations students
can readily grasp that the mere statement of applicable rules is inadequate to solve any legal problem complex enough to be the subject of
dispute.
Judge Edwards says that legal education does not do enough to
teach certain practical skills. I agree wholeheartedly. But I do not
think teaching doctrinal reasoning is one of those deficiencies; we do
more of that than anything else. Our casebooks are still even more
overwhelmingly doctrinal than our scholarship; and by the end of the
first year, with the help of moot courts, most students get quite good at
massaging doctrine. My list of the skills they do not develop would
include: working with statutes, administrative rules, and other noncase materials; working with messy and complicated factual records;
drafting legal instruments like contracts, settlement agreements, opinion letters, and informal letters to clients; making sustained, as opposed to two- or three-sentence, policy arguments supported by
empirical data; making normative arguments based on open-ended cri81. For reasons I have never understood, students who were entirely capable of sustained
abstract thought in college lose most of that capacity in law school. The minute that a teacher
launches a discussion of theory, policy, ethics, or social context that is not immediately and
closely tied to resolving a case situation, most of the students tune out and put down their pens.
They know, of course, that they will only be examined on the cases and the principles and policies extracted from the cases. By the way, this classroom reaction, which every teacher I know
experiences as intensely frustrating, ought to please Judge Edwards. For it means that the "theoretical" orientation of legal scholarship does not percolate down very much into the classroom:
most students just ignore it. My impression is confirmed by a recent study of Harvard Law
students. See generally ROBERT GRANFIELD, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS (1992).
I imagine this phenomenon has something to do with students' developing conceptions of
professional identity, which relegate all nondoctrinal material to the realm of the "impractical."
But where, and from whom, do students learn to do that? Interestingly enough, in recent years I
have found that it is often my conservative students, the members of the Federalist Society, who
have been most immune from the deadly virus - of which even Judge Edwards has caught a
strain - that spreads the distinction between the "intellectual" and the "practical." The Federalists seem totally aware of the practical utility of building a worldview out of history, political
theory, and economics, and legal theory that in turn will inform their views of practice and their
reform agenda as lawyers. By contrast some of my more left-wing students, to my considerable
distress, refuse to see how useful theory could be to their causes, reject it as elitist garbage, and
view anecdote, autobiography, and polemic as sufficient substitutes.
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teria of justice, morality, and fairness; and acquiring a working knowledge of how legal institutions actually operate, not just in formal
supposition but in fact. 82
In other words, the narrow doctrinalism of law students is something we have to keep struggling against. That struggle is best done in
highly specific exercises, such as problem-method teaching through
thickly described cases - like Harvard Business School cases, not appellate cases - and in clinical settings. 83
For what he perceives to be the deplorable ethical condition of the
practicing bar, the Judge's remedy is exactly the same: more doctrinal
teaching - informed, naturally, by more doctrinal scholarship - in
the law schools! This is a bit like trying to clean up the Augean stables
with a teaspoon. If ethical misconduct of the grossest kind is in fact
increasing - and there is a widespread view among judges and bar
leaders that it is - the reasons for the increase are, as pointed out
before, structural and systemic, a function of sharply increased competition among firms for business, and among lawyers within firms for a
share of "you eat what you kill" compensation. To hold and attract
litigation clients nowadays, a law firm and lawyers within the firm
have to acquire a reputation as killer, big-winner litigators. In a big
case, the temptations to conceal documents, abuse discovery, make
strategic use of sanctions, distort precedent, and ignore harm done to
third parties and the public interest are immense. It is not surprising
that partners and associates should sometimes give in to them; or that
some firms should gradually develop an ethical culture in which, because "everybody does it," doing it is just tit-for-tat behavior in the
jungle where one must try to survive. In the abstract every lawyer
involved may know at some level that this sort of behavior is "wrong"
- but the capacity for denial and rationalization when large interests
are at stake is very great.
Yet every time I go to a bar meeting or conference, I hear that
lawyers and judges who deplore this situation want the schools to fix it
up by teaching better ethics! Well, I think we can teach ethics better
82. I cannot emphasize enough this vital but neglected component of legal education. Much
of practitioners' most valuable practical knowledge is not in the least doctrinal. Some of it is
intensely local knowledge - what the judges are like, which court clerks are cooperative, local
procedural customs - and there is no point trying to teach that in law school. Some is craft
knowledge, best taught through apprenticeship. But some is overall knowledge of structural and
institutional features - how fee arrangements structure incentives to sue and settle; how discovery and sanction rules may affect strategy; how police, prosecutors and parole officers see their
work and ordinarily behave; and so forth - that the systematic inquiry of scholars can grasp,
and write up in ways that can, in turn, be taught to students.
83. Judge Edwards seems generally to concur with this last point. Edwards, supra note 1, at
62-63.
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in the schools than we do, and it might do some good if we did. What
we need for this purpose are exercises that put students in practice
situations much like the ones they are going to occupy, with lots of
pressure from partners and clients to commit or overlook ethical violations. We can teach them how to recognize and analyze ethical
problems of practice. We can also teach - and would be able to teach
a lot better if there were more empirical studies of practice - more
about the structures of practice, the client relationships, the compensation systems, and the politics of bar discipline that are likely to produce ethical violations. We can recommend ways to reform the
system to offset its perverse incentives - through sanctions, through
more effective regulation by outside agencies, through whistleblower
protection, through installation of ombudsmen or review committees
within law firms for lawyers who are being pressured into dubious
conduct to consult, through revised compensation schemes that would
impose heavy penalties within firms for ethical violations, and, yes,
through moral education conducted jointly by the schools and
respected senior bar leaders and judges. Moreover, our graduates,
when they become partners and law reformers themselves, can try to
get these reforms adopted. Structural problems require structural reforms. No amount of moralizing to lawyers by the schools, the bar
elite, or the judiciary is going to accomplish much unless it changes
the system to change the incentives. The methods described above
would all be very practical teaching indeed, though they have virtually
no connection with doctrine.
But none of these suggestions will ultimately do any good at all
unless adopted by the powerful people in practice - under Judge Edwards' hypothesis, the lawyers responsible for creating the culture that
encourages the misconduct in the first place. We can advise the student about to become a law firm associate that, if a partner tells her to
destroy a document, she should go up the hierarchy and consult a
respected senior partner. But suppose the senior partner backs up the
junior? The associate can refuse of course, at the risk of being fired, or
quit. But what signal will these actions send to the other associates?
Why, that sticking to your principles is naive and will do you in. This
problem is not one that their law schools, with or without the assistance of splendid doctrinal teaching, can solve. When the bench and
bar look to the law schools to solve problems by teaching virtue that
practitioners could realistically only address by taking collective action themselves to toughen ethical standards, restructuring organizations like law firms, and imposing meaningful sanctions, it is a sign
that their interest in reform is mostly symbolic.
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In looking over this piece, I see I have painted a rather radiant,
even Panglossian picture of legal scholarship. In truth it has been my
intention to present legal scholarship in its most favorable aspects and
to defend it against attacks that seem to me unfair and inaccurate as
well as in some part justified. The fact that many practitioners do not
appreciate the practical value of nondoctrinal scholarship - especially
theoretical, interdisciplinary, and critical work - does not mean that
it has none, though it may well mean that we ought to work much
harder to make its utility apparent. Yet, though I really think the
legal academy has improved enormously since my own law schooling
in the late 1960s, it is nothing about which to be smug. Legal scholarship is still overwhelmingly preoccupied with doctrine, case law, and
the judge-centered model of the legal process to the relative neglect of
legislation and administration, the counseling and transactional
dimensions of law practice, and the sustained study of the policies and
values underlying legal practices. It is also hugely, disproportionately,
focused on the sexy issues of public law, especially constitutional law.
Teaching is still mostly parsing cases instead of problem-based and
clinical. Some of the new wave of scholarship does indeed seem horribly pretentious and vacuous - schlock economics, schlock history,
schlock philosophy, schlock poststructuralist theory - with little
promise of helping anybody to understand the legal world or work in
it or transform it. Almost all the articles are far too long. 84 Empirical
or law-in-action work of all kinds is underdone and undervalued.
Not that much, in short, has changed. Law teachers are mostly
plowing and planting on the old "middle ground" between the reflective world of the university and the active world of the practitioner.
As they always have, they are describing and analyzing the practices
of lawyers - all too often unfortunately only the doctrinal practices
- finding their normative bases in policy and principle and suggesting
ways of improving the practices to make them serve the principles and
policies better. To switch metaphors, the scholars are still walking the
tightrope between frankly speaking truth to the powerful and adopting
enough of the discourse and conventions of the powerful to have some
influence in their world. This kind of work has, since the beginning of
the university law school, been theoretical, interdisciplinary, and at
least somewhat critical. It may well be that in recent years the theory
has become more formal, the interdisciplinary component less ama84. I say this with some sheepishness because this piece was originally planned as a tenpager.
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teurish, and the criticism more intense - reflecting both prevailing
intellectual tendencies and the increasing political diversity of the academic as well as of the practicing profession. But legal scholarship is
still primarily the earnest and high-minded work of legal improvement. Most scholars continue to assume that the managers of the
legal system want the system to work justly and efficiently and to serve
its best purposes; and that when deficiencies are pointed out, and rational arguments made for amendment, concerned lawyers will respond with dialogue and collaborate in the reform effort, if necessary
even against their own and their clients' immediate interests. Judge
Edwards is clearly such a concerned lawyer himself. Yet much of
what he and his survey sample have to say is a chilling reminder of the
ways in which the practical agenda of legal scholarship - despite its
record of undeniable successes - is often just an intellectuals' dream
fantasy of rationalist authority and influence over a profession that no
longer exists, a play enacted to an empty theater.

